How do African populations perceive corruption: microeconomic evidence from Afrobarometer data in twelve countries by Attila, Gbewopo
How do African populations perceive corruption:
microeconomic evidence from Afrobarometer data in
twelve countries
Gbewopo Attila
To cite this version:
Gbewopo Attila. How do African populations perceive corruption: microeconomic evidence
from Afrobarometer data in twelve countries. 2008.11. 2011. <halshs-00556805>
HAL Id: halshs-00556805
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00556805
Submitted on 17 Jan 2011
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2008.11 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Document de travail de la série 
Etudes et Documents 
E 2008.11 
 
How do African populations perceive corruption:  
microeconomic evidence from Afrobarometer data in twelve countries 
 
Gbewopo Attila1 
CERDI-CNRS, UMR 6587 
University of Auvergne, Clermont I 
 
 
July 2008 
****** 
                                                 
1
 The author would like to thank the following for helpful comments and suggestions: Stephen Hall, Kaddour Hadri, 
Sylvain Boko and participants of the 11th annual meeting of African Econometric Society, Dakar July 5-7 2006. He is 
also grateful to Jean-Louis Combes, Gérard Chambas, Mathilde Maurel, Wladimir Andreff, and François Roubaud. 
Any errors of omission or interpretations remain the responsibility of the author. Please adress correspondance to : 
CERDI-CNRS, 65 Bd François Mitterrand, E-mail: G.Attila@u-clermont1.fr ; Tel +33 4 73 17 74 41; Fax: +33 4 73 
17 74 28.  
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2008.11 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract  
 
In this paper, we examine the microeconomic determinants of the perception of corruption in 
twelve Sub-Saharan African countries. Unlike the indicators of corruption based on the opinion 
of international experts, the study focuses on corrupt practices as experienced by the African 
people themselves. The results of our estimates, using an ordered probit indicate that the 
individual characteristics such as age and sex significantly affect the perception people have of 
corruption as do social and political factors like access to information (press, media, radio). 
However, neither democracy nor participation in demonstrations, seem to affect the attitude of 
individuals towards corruption. 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Corruption, Sub-Saharan Africa, Ordered Probit 
JEL: H11, O12 
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Introduction 
 
 Since the early 1980s, the problem of low development in African countries has been 
primarily attributed to institutional weakness (Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al, 2001). It is 
also well established that corruption slows economic growth or development (Mauro, 1995, 1997; 
Dreher and Herzfeld, 2005; Gerlagh and Pelligrini, 2004; Gyimah-Brempong, 2002; Gyimah-
Brempong and de Camacho, 2006; Minorov, 2005). Some authors talk of a culture of corruption 
(Le Vine, 1975) and of the complexity of corruption in Africa2 (Blundo and de Sardan, 2001) 
because it is there systemic and widespread across all sectors (Médard, 1998). Other authors 
consider that African countries have specific socio-cultural characteristics such as ethnic 
fractionalization (cf. Easterly and Levine, 1997) or ethnic conflict (cf. Collier and Hoeffler, 2002; 
Collier, 2003) that negatively affect the process of economic development. 
 According to existing indicators (Kaufman et al. (World Bank), CPI (Transparency 
International); ICRG index, etc.), African countries seem to be often ranked as the most corrupt 
in the world (see table A1 in appendix). However, the various indicators of corruption as assessed 
by international experts have been criticized (Arndt and Oman, 2006; Kurtz and Schrank, 2007). 
Thus, the need to take into account the views of local populations becomes paramount. While 
more than 50% of local people surveyed consider corruption as a major social problems (TI, 
2003), there seems to be no correlation between the perception of these populations and the 
assessment of international experts (Roubaud and Razafindrakoto, 2006).  
 The aim of the present study is to provide an empirical analysis of microeconomic 
determinants of the perception of corruption in a sample of African countries. This paper presents 
three novel features. First, we focus our analysis on a sample of countries where corruption 
prevails. The populations of these countries are frequently confronted with this problem, and 
hence their assessment is less likely to be misjudged. By taking into account the expression of 
personal experience, this approach might succeed in narrowing the gap between expert opinion 
and that of African people themselves. By avoiding errors of judgment, anti-corruption policies 
may therefore be much more accurately targeted and effective.  
                                                 
2
 Unless otherwise specified, Africa refers to Sub-Saharan Africa. 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2008.11 
 
4 
 
 Second, the econometric analysis conducted here is the first attempt to identify factors that 
govern perception of corruption in African countries. Methodically, taking into account local 
people's views requires the identification of individual, social, political and economic factors that 
shape their behavior vis-à-vis corruption. Notwithstanding the importance of such factors and 
their impact on corruption, there is a paucity of empirical studies at the micro level. In this 
perspective, the present study differs from previous works in several aspects. Swamy et al. (2000) 
focus on the behavior of enterprises and businessmen in Georgia while Svensson et al. (2003) and 
Svensson (2003) examine the business environment in Uganda. Čábelková (2001) analyzes 
individual attitudes towards corruption and individual perceptions of individuals of corruption in 
Ukraine. Mocan (2004) analyzes individual experience of corruption in 49 countries, only 4 of 
which are African. Our study focuses on the perception of corruption in a sample composed 
exclusively of (twelve) African countries. In addition, we focus the analysis on microeconomic 
factors alone while Mocan combines individual factors and factors (political and social) measured 
at the macroeconomic level. The studies of Reineikka and Svenson (2003, 2005), using an 
experimental approach in a school-grant program involving in a sample consisting of schools 
(250 in the 1996 original survey) in Uganda, showed that increased public access to information 
is an important tool to reduce the capture and misappropriation of public funds allocated to 
education.  
 
 Finally, this study is based on original data from households’ opinion surveys in 12 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa covering up to 16000 individuals over the period 1999-2001. 
The data allow us to consider many facets of corruption: corruption among civil servants, the 
extent of bribery in public administration, corruption among elected leaders and the way in which 
public authorities handle corruption. 
 
 The rest of this article is organized as follows. The first section presents the factors that 
affect the perception of corruption. The second section outlines the empirical methodology in the 
present study; and the last section discusses the major findings. 
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 Section 1- Factors influencing the perception of corruption 
Here, we review the individual characteristics and other factors that shape the perception 
of corruption. 
 1.1- Individual and social characteristics  
 (1) Age: The young and elderly feel less concerned by the problems of corruption than the 
middle age who are employed. Also, their perception of corruption is less precise.  
 (2) Gender: Gender has received special attention in the analysis of corruption in 
particular in the policies of deterrence (Swamy et al. 2001; Dollar, Gatti, et al, 2003; Mocan, 
2004). Because men and women have different roles in society, they react differently to 
corruption. More generally, women are considered to have a greater aversion to corruption than 
men. Men are more frequently targets in the market of corruption for several reasons (Mocan, 
2004). The first is that in most countries, especially developing countries, men are more active 
than women in the labour market. The second is that men are more likely tolerant of dishonest 
activities (Mocan, 2004; Swamy et al., 2001). In other words, women have a more ethical 
viewpoint and focus on the interests of the community (Dollar, Gatti, et al, 2003). 
 
(3) Employment and wealth: The relationship between employment and corruption can 
be established through the profitability of a business (and the benefit gained from corruption) 
(Čábelková, 2001). Businessmen have more contacts with officials than the rest of the population. 
The propensity of bureaucrats to demand a bribe is great because they know that potential 
“victims” have a high enough income level. This is not the case, however, for individuals who are 
less active in the labour market or are absent from it altogether (Mocan, 2004). The situation is 
different for farmers. They believe that everything is limited in quantity (cultivable area, harvests, 
etc.) and taking bribes can be seen as an opportunity for obtaining a greater share of the cake.  
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 (4) The place of residence: The decision to corrupt individuals depends on the perception 
of corruption in the given setting. In large cities, for example, there are more economic 
opportunities than in small towns. There is therefore a substantial incentive for a businessman to 
pay bribes to get a large market share in big cities or a monopoly position in small towns. In 
addition, unlike small towns or villages, cities favour anonymity and thus make it easier for 
individuals to engage clandestinely in reprehensible activities. 
 
 1.2- Other local factors of corruption 
 Local factors concern other social and political settings that shape individual attitudes 
towards corruption. 
Political characteristics of countries shape individual attitudes. Populations express more 
freely their opinions on the performance of public administration, political leaders, etc. in 
democratic countries than autocratic ones.  
 Publicly available information plays a great role in individuals’ attitude vis-à-vis 
corruption. Decisions are influenced by two major sources of information (Čábelková, 2001). 
 (i) Media: The press, radio and television are sources of information exposing the nature 
and extent of corruption in a country. The revelation of bribery of officials in newspapers, news 
and documentaries in these media inform people and raise awareness about the state of 
corruption. Reineikka and Svensson (2003, 2005) showed that increased public access to 
information is an important tool to reduce capture and corruption in education sector in Uganda.  
 (ii) Experience: It seems to be the most reliable source. Both personal experience that of 
relatives or neighbors influence individuals’ choice. Individuals may face explicit requests or 
flagrant bribes or implicit slowdowns of bureaucratic procedures. In contrast, the individual has 
the option of offering bribes to speed up procedures. Thus, when people come in contact with a 
public administration, their perceptions of corrupt practices become more reliable.  
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Section 2- Econometric analysis of determinants of the perception of corruption 
 2.1- The empirical methodology 
 The method used in this study is based on a pseudo panel in which we have survey data 
on individuals from different countries over the same period. The variable of corruption is 
observed for each individual. The model to estimate corruption takes the form: 
 
* '
ij i ij ijy Xα β ε= + +  (1) 
with (i, j) representing respectively the country and individual, ijX  the vector of determinant of 
perception of corruption by individual i  from country j . *ijy  is unobservable. In an opinion 
survey, respondents express their own feelings toward corruption, which depend on observable 
factors ijX  and certain unobservable factors ε , in a such a way that the chosen value ijy  remains 
as close as possible to their own feelings.  
The variable of corruption is an ordered variable with four modalities:  
 
*
1
*
1 2
*
2 3
*
4
1  0   (almost all)
2   (most)
3   (some)
y = 4 si y µ            (almost none)
y si y
y si y
y si y
µ
µ µ
µ µ
 = < <

= < <

= < <
 ≥
 (2) 
 
1 2 3 3, , ,µ µ µ µ  are unknown parameters to be estimated with the β 3 coefficients. 
                                                 
3
 The probabilities of having the y values are calculated as follows: (Green, 2003) : 
1 1 1
1 2 2 1
3 2
4 3
4
Pr(y=0) = Pr( 'X+  < ) = Pr(  < - 'X) = F( - 'X)
Pr(y=1) = Pr( < 'Xb +  < ) = F( - 'X) - F( - 'X)
Pr(y=2) = F( - 'X) - F( - 'X)
Pr(y=3) = F( - 'X) - F( - 'X)
Pr(y=4) = Pr( < 'X+ ) = 1 - F(
β ε µ ε µ β µ β
µ β ε µ µ β µ β
µ β µ β
µ β µ β
µ β ε 4 - 'X)
F() is the the normal distribution function. 
µ β
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Our estimation method is the ordered probit with unknown parameters. Such an approach 
is justified by the fact that corruption data are rankings. The use of ordinary least squares is not 
appropriate insofar as it treats equally the difference between a 1 and a 2 as that between a 3 and 
a 4 (Greene, 2003). The probit or logit models would also fail to account for the ordinal nature of 
the dependent variable. 
The interest of pooling data from different countries is to have a maximum of information. 
In addition, through this approach, we presuppose that behavior is uniform across the different 
countries studied. However, in order to control for the heterogeneity between countries, we 
included in the equations country dummy variables.  
 
 2.2- Data source 
 The data used in this analysis from the first round of Afrobarometer households surveys in 
12 countries in Africa over the period 1999-20014. Given the ambiguity of the concept of 
corruption, Afrobarometer uses a narrow definition of corruption: "bribes, gifts or benefits to 
officers of the government". Moreover, it does not address issues such as favoritism or 
nepotism. The survey collected the opinions of ordinary citizens, and thus did not target the elite. 
Finally, in each country, surveys are conducted on a representative sample of the populations. 
We selected four variables of corruption in this study: 
(i) Corruption among civil servants: how many civil servants, or those who work in 
government offices and ministries, do you think are involved in corruption 
 
(ii) Extent of corruption/ Bribery: What about corruption? How many officials in the 
government do you think are involved in corruption? 
 
(iii) Corruption among elected leaders: What about corruption? How many people in 
the parliament do you think are involved in corruption? 
                                                 
4
 The data is available on www.afrobarometer.org.  
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(iv) Handling corruption: How well would you say the government is handling the 
following matters? 
 The definition of the variables of corruption is presented in appendix A2. The explanatory 
variables are described in appendix A3. 
 2.3- Descriptive statistics 
 Tables 1 to 4 present the salient features of these data by country. A quick look at these 
tables shows that African people have a perception of high corruption in the political and 
administrative spheres. The interest of such indicators is that the phenomenon of corruption is 
assessed by those who are face to face with the problem because they are involved either directly 
or indirectly through various local processes. 
 2.3.1- Corruption among civil servants 
34% of respondents in Zimbabwe consider that almost all civil servants are corrupt. This 
proportion is close to other countries like Tanzania (28%), Uganda (30%) and Mali (27%). In 
Zimbabwe, about 66% (34% almost all+ 32% most) of individuals surveyed perceive corruption 
as a great problem. This corruption pattern holds for the aforementioned countries (Tanzania, 
Uganda and Mali). 
 
  Table 1 : Corruption among civil servants 
Country almost all most some almost none don't know refuse to answer Missing Total 
Botswana 4.58 26.92 26 11.67 29.17 0.17 1.5 100 
Lesotho 9.09 20.82 43.67 3.4 22.6 0 0.42 100 
Malawi 12.83 33.11 32.45 4.97 15.73 0 0.91 100 
Mali 26.71 32.7 17.57 11.25 11.78 0 0 100 
Namibia 3.89 20.54 39.22 15.38 20.46 0 0.51 100 
South Africa 14.41 35.64 34.5 3.55 11.91 0 0 100 
Tanzania 27.57 34.71 20.47 13.1 4.14 0 0 100 
Uganda 29.59 34.96 15.54 9.11 10.22 0.09 0.48 100 
Zambie 22.45 27.21 29.05 3.76 16.86 0.17 0.5 100 
Zimbabwe 33.75 31.5 15.5 4.33 13.67 0.42 0.83 100 
Total 14.82 22.94 19.25 6.16 10.43 0.05 26.35 100 
 Source: our calculation, based on Afrobarometer data. NB The average proportion of missing data in the overall sample is 
 overvalued by taking into account the countries (Ghana and Nigeria) that did not participate in the investigations:  
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 2.3.2- Corruption among elected leaders 
 As might be expected elected officials are not immune to corruption. The proportion of 
individuals perceiving almost all civil servants as corrupt is 23% in Mali and Uganda and 36% in 
Zimbabwe. Individuals who work with public administration or are connected to it consider the 
phenomenon more severely: for the total sample, nine out of ten officials believe that almost all 
elected leaders are corrupt. The same view is held by two soldiers in three, and by nearly 20% of 
businessmen, who are accustomed to dealing with elected officials for tenders, public 
procurement, public works, etc. These results seem to confirm two basic assumptions in the 
literature. On the one hand political corruption is seen as a serious cause of dysfunctioning, given 
that most African countries are governed by non-democratic regimes, and on the other hand, the 
public administration is highly politicized. 
 
Table 2- Corruption among elected leaders 
 almost all most some almost none don’t know 
refuse to 
answer missing All 
Botswana 5.67 23.17 30.42 10.50 28.25 0.17 1.83 100.00 
Lesotho 7.99 12.32 41.38 5.61 32.63 0.00 0.08 100.00 
Malawi 5.79 25.00 35.60 7.86 25.66 0.00 0.08 100.00 
Mali 22.98 25.66 18.67 15.51 17.19 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Namibia 3.89 15.05 37.28 15.98 26.54 0.00 1.27 100.00 
South Africa 15.73 29.91 37.82 4.86 11.68 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Tanzania 19.06 26.57 24.34 24.48 5.55 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Uganda 23.91 35.49 18.98 13.25 7.93 0.13 0.31 100.00 
Zambia 18.45 21.20 28.21 4.51 26.13 0.08 1.42 100.00 
Zimbabwe 36.08 26.92 14.58 3.42 16.92 0.58 1.50 100.00 
All 12.63 18.88 20.55 8.55 12.92 0.06 26.42 100.00 
 Source: our calculation, based on Afrobarometer data. NB The average proportion of missing data in the overall sample is 
 overvalued by taking into account the countries (Ghana and Nigeria) that did not participate in the investigations:  
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 2.3.3- Extent of corruption 
 Corruption is more widespread in two countries in our sample: Ghana and Nigeria. Other 
countries also experience high levels of corruption. In Ghana, about 62% of respondents believe 
that almost all officials are involved in corruption against 46% in Nigeria for the same category. 
Likewise, respectively 32 and 42 in every 100 people in Tanzania and Zimbabwe consider 
corruption as widespread.  
 
Tableau 3- Extent of corruption (bribery) 
 almost all Most some almost none don’t know 
refuse to 
answer   missing All 
Botswana 5.92 26.00 26.00 10.83 29.33 0.00 1.92 100.00 
Ghana 62.28 22.16 8.18 6.74 0.05 0.00 0.60 100.00 
Lesotho 9.35 18.61 41.04 6.46 24.04 0.00 0.51 100.00 
Malawi 14.74 27.81 30.46 8.94 17.96 0.08 0.00 100.00 
Mali 17.62 25.37 31.12 14.89 11.01 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Namibia 6.42 18.17 36.60 16.48 21.98 0.00 0.34 100.00 
Nigeria 46.24 26.98 14.99 9.38 2.41 0.00 0.00 100.00 
South Africa 16.59 33.59 35.45 3.95 10.41 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Tanzania 32.48 35.76 19.47 8.69 3.59 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Uganda 22.90 27.26 23.21 18.76 7.09 0.00 0.79 100.00 
Zambia 24.04 27.46 27.55 4.01 16.44 0.25 0.25 100.00 
Zimbabwe 42.33 26.67 14.42 4.00 11.75 0.58 0.25 100.00 
All countries 28.39 27.04 24.10 9.72 10.39 0.05 0.32 100.00 
Source: our calculation, based on Afrobarometer data 
 
 2.3.4- Handling corruption 
 Two groups could be classified at this level. In the first group, which can be described as 
"most inefficient", Ghana and South African Republic are at the top. The actions of government 
in these countries are perceived as inefficient, according to a global assessment by over 33% of 
the male population as against only 28% of women. Thus, in Ghana nearly 61% of respondents 
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felt that the anti-corruption policy is very poor (Table 4). This view seems to be shared by people 
in other countries including the South African Republic and Mali where the figure is respectively 
67% and 51%. The second category of countries, the "most efficient", includes Nigeria, Tanzania 
and Uganda with 64%. 55% and 51% of people surveyed who consider public actions have some 
effectiveness. In all cases, there was no clearcut distinction between urban and rural populations. 
 
Table 4- Handling of corruption  
Pays Very badly  Quite badly  Fairly well Very well Don’t know  Missing Total 
Ghana 43.46 17.81 21.86 9.38 7.14 0.35 100 
Mali 25.71 25.51 21.11 14.84 12.83 0.00 100 
Nigeria 14.85 16.40 45.16 19.04 4.55 0.00 100 
South Africa 39.50 27.64 20.64 8.23 4.00 0.00 100 
Tanzania 25.25 17.52 37.63 17.06 2.55 0.00 100 
Uganda 18.32 19.29 36.50 14.88 10.52 0.48 100 
Moyenne 17.57 13.52 21.44 9.65 4.45 33.37 100 
Source: our calculation, based on Afrobarometer data 
 
 Opinion differs according to occupation or employment status. While more than a third of 
the unemployed, religious leaders and employers rated anti-corruption policy poorly or very 
poorly, politicians, soldiers and officials had a (very) favorable opinion (48%, 67%, 40% 
respectively). It is tempting to conclude that officials appreciate the positive actions of the State. 
In contrast, the police negatively appreciate (24%) the same policy. 
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Section 3- Results and discussion 
 Before interpreting the results, a few points are worth noting. First, the interpretation of 
coefficients obtained by the ordered probit model is not straightforward (Greene, 2003). It is also 
necessary to clarify the direction in which the indicator of corruption varies: a score of 1 on the 
index indicates a high level of corruption while 4 indicates a low level. As for the variable 
representing the fight against corruption 4 means that the policies implemented by the authorities 
are considered very effective. More specifically, a negative sign reflects the likelihood of 
perceiving a high level of corruption while a positive sign indicates a low perception thereof. The 
results are presented in Tables 5 and 6.  
 
 
 3.1- Individual characteristics 
 Our estimates show that the overall impact of individual characteristics on perceptions 
varies depending on the form of corruption as do the predicted probabilities of perception (see 
table A4 in appendices). These probabilities also vary depending on the country. Most 
noteworthy is that the countries of the sample have different predicted probabilities for high 
levels of corruption. In other words, views are divergent when the level of corruption is high 
(modalities 1 and 2 in the right side of the graphs in appendix A5). However, when corruption is 
low the views of people from different countries converge on the perception of the phenomenon 
(modalities 3 and 4 in the left side of the graphs in appendix A5). 
 There is a U-shape between age and the perception of corruption. This means that as age 
increases people have a greater probability of perceiving a high level of corruption among 
officials. When we look at the evaluation of anti-corruption policy, older people believe that the 
authorities do not tackle the problem effectively. In both cases, his probability decreases after a 
certain threshold. This threshold is estimated approximately to be 35 years for the perception of 
corruption among civil servants and 54-55 years for anti-corruption policy. The higher peoples’ 
level of education, the higher the probability that they perceive corruption among officials to be a 
serious problem but to a lesser extent among elected leaders. 
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 The results show that gender affects significantly the perception of corruption, in 
whatever form. Women tend to perceive lesser level of corruption in all spheres of government 
compared to males. This result is consistent with that of Mocan (2004) but seems to contradict 
the cross-country result established by Swamy et al. (2001) that women tend to pay less bribes 
and are more honest than men. Nevertheless, one can explain this seemingly paradox by the fact 
that men interact more with public administration and hence pay bribes more often.  
 Regarding the status of employment, it appears that in general those who have a 
connection with public administration are much more likely to perceive less corruption. This is 
the case of officials and businessmen. The positive role often attributed to NGOs in the fight 
against corruption in some African countries is not clearly evidenced in this study. At least with 
respect to corruption and the fight against it, there is no significant difference between the 
perception of NGOs workers and that of the rest of populations. 
 The place of residence has a strong impact on the perception of corruption. In this respect, 
our results corroborate theoretical predictions (Čábelková, 2001). It is clear from our estimates 
that those in rural areas have a low perception of corruption. This result is confirmed by the same 
low perception on the part of farmers. Finally, it is highly likely that the rural poor have a low 
probability of perception of corruption. 
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Table 5: Microeconomic determinants of extent of corruption and corruption among civil servants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent of corruption (bribery) (pfpcr2) Corruption among civil servants(pfpcr4) 
 (1.2) (2.2) (3.2) (4.2) (1.4) (2.4) (3.4) (4.4) 
Age -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.007* -0.007* -0.007** -0.007** 
 (1.30) (1.29) (1.44) (1.42) (1.90) (1.89) (2.00) (1.98) 
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
 (1.16) (1.21) (1.29) (1.33) (2.32) (2.38) (2.41) (2.47) 
Gender (Female=1) 0.091*** 0.105*** 0.090*** 0.106*** 0.126*** 0.142*** 0.126*** 0.143*** 
 (4.50) (5.22) (4.47) (5.24) (6.32) (7.12) (6.30) (7.12) 
Rural 0.111*** 0.144*** 0.127*** 0.166*** 0.086*** 0.124*** 0.098*** 0.139*** 
 (4.80) (6.47) (5.54) (7.49) (3.73) (5.43) (4.25) (6.07) 
Education -0.022 -0.027* -0.024 -0.030* -0.029 -0.038 -0.031 -0.041 
 (1.56) (1.70) (1.64) (1.78) (1.45) (1.43) (1.47) (1.43) 
Indicator of poverty 0.172*** 0.179***   0.122*** 0.130***   
 (6.13) (6.23)   (5.03) (5.20)   
General trust in the society 0.016** 0.016** 0.017** 0.018** 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.018 
 (2.15) (2.18) (2.36) (2.40) (1.37) (1.40) (1.46) (1.50) 
Being member of an association -0.085*** -0.091*** -0.075*** -0.082*** -0.076*** -0.087*** -0.069*** -0.080*** 
 (3.76) (4.10) (3.36) (3.69) (3.33) (3.85) (3.04) (3.54) 
Participate in a demonstration  0.006  0.011  -0.021  -0.017  
 (0.26)  (0.48)  (0.89)  (0.72)  
Write to the press -0.006 -0.007* -0.006 -0.007* -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 
 (1.48) (1.81) (1.37) (1.71) (0.37) (0.71) (0.31) (0.65) 
Listen to radio -0.038***  -0.039***  -0.029***  -0.029***  
 (5.89)  (6.04)  (4.32)  (4.44)  
Watching TV 0.004*  0.004  0.005**  0.004**  
 (1.70)  (1.56)  (2.08)  (1.96)  
Reading news -0.035***  -0.039***  -0.038***  -0.040***  
 (5.89)  (6.42)  (6.17)  (6.47)  
Access to information  -0.224***  -0.235***  -0.150***  -0.158*** 
  (6.94)  (7.29)  (4.38)  (4.60) 
Democracy 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.44) (0.66) (0.54) (0.78) (1.27) (1.51) (1.34) (1.60) 
Trust in the court of appeal 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.084*** 0.085*** 
 (4.22) (4.22) (4.28) (4.28) (7.06) (7.10) (7.08) (7.12) 
Unemployed -0.047 -0.033 -0.065 -0.050 -0.024 -0.007 -0.038 -0.020 
 (0.40) (0.28) (0.56) (0.43) (0.22) (0.06) (0.34) (0.18) 
Dummy informal worker -0.044 -0.030 -0.037 -0.021 0.060 0.076* 0.064 0.082** 
 (1.17) (0.81) (0.98) (0.57) (1.52) (1.92) (1.64) (2.07) 
Dummy businessman 0.053 0.072 0.060 0.080 0.100 0.118* 0.105 0.124* 
 (0.86) (1.15) (0.96) (1.29) (1.45) (1.69) (1.53) (1.79) 
Dummy official -0.026 -0.038 -0.025 -0.038 0.219 0.204 0.220 0.204 
 (0.16) (0.23) (0.15) (0.23) (1.08) (0.99) (1.09) (1.00) 
Dummy NGO -0.121 -0.110 -0.114 -0.102 -0.015 0.001 -0.010 0.007 
 (1.15) (1.05) (1.10) (0.98) (0.12) (0.01) (0.08) (0.06) 
Dummy peasant 0.100 0.088 0.133 0.121 0.166 0.153 0.190 0.178 
 (0.66) (0.58) (0.87) (0.80) (1.08) (1.00) (1.24) (1.17) 
Dummy politician -0.355 -0.328 -0.343 -0.313 -0.519* -0.489 -0.511* -0.479 
 (1.43) (1.31) (1.40) (1.27) (1.74) (1.64) (1.72) (1.60) 
Country dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of observations 12192 12192 12192 12192 12183 12183 12183 12183 
 z statistics in parentheses ; *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
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Table 6: Microeconomic determinants of handling of corruption and corruption among elected leaders 
  
 
Handling corruption (pfpcr1) Corruption among elected leaders  (pfpcr3) 
 (1.1) (2.1) (3.1) (4.1) (1.3) (2.3) (3.3) (4.3) 
Age -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 
 (3.33) (3.25) (3.29) (3.20) (1.51) (1.47) (1.63) (1.59) 
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
 (2.72) (2.60) (2.63) (2.50) (2.01) (2.08) (2.10) (2.18) 
Gender (Female=1) 0.119*** 0.114*** 0.120*** 0.116*** 0.075*** 0.093*** 0.074*** 0.093*** 
 (4.13) (4.02) (4.18) (4.12) (3.79) (4.71) (3.75) (4.71) 
Rural 0.173*** 0.160*** 0.205*** 0.200*** 0.069*** 0.126*** 0.081*** 0.146*** 
 (4.82) (4.73) (5.80) (6.05) (3.06) (5.81) (3.61) (6.74) 
Education -0.072*** -0.066*** -0.087*** -0.084*** -0.022** -0.033** -0.025** -0.037** 
 (3.67) (3.54) (4.36) (4.39) (2.08) (2.23) (2.16) (2.29) 
Indicator of poverty 0.296*** 0.297***   0.138*** 0.158***   
 (5.35) (5.34)   (4.55) (4.92)   
General trust in the society -0.047*** -0.048*** -0.045*** -0.046*** 0.020** 0.020** 0.021** 0.021** 
 (3.37) (3.46) (3.23) (3.33) (2.11) (1.98) (2.22) (2.08) 
Being member of an association -0.036 -0.027 -0.013 -0.004 -0.108*** -0.123*** -0.098*** -0.112*** 
 (1.07) (0.80) (0.40) (0.13) (4.85) (5.58) (4.43) (5.11) 
Participate in a demonstration  0.099***  0.114***  0.019  0.026  
 (2.62)  (3.06)  (0.82)  (1.13)  
Write to the press 0.046*** 0.048*** 0.052*** 0.054*** 0.013** 0.012* 0.014** 0.012* 
 (4.00) (4.19) (4.44) (4.65) (2.03) (1.88) (2.02) (1.86) 
Listen to radio -0.011  -0.011  -0.027***  -0.027***  
 (1.08)  (1.12)  (4.10)  (4.23)  
Watching TV 0.008  0.005  0.002  0.001  
 (0.90)  (0.59)  (0.66)  (0.45)  
Reading news -0.001  -0.005  -0.051***  -0.055***  
 (0.15)  (0.49)  (8.74)  (9.43)  
Access to information  -0.075  -0.092*  -0.176***  -0.189*** 
  (1.52)  (1.87)  (5.23)  (5.64) 
Democracy -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.56) (0.58) (0.38) (0.41) (1.41) (1.05) (1.42) (1.05) 
Trust in the court of appeal 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.148*** 0.148*** 0.100*** 0.100*** 0.102*** 0.103*** 
 (13.60) (13.56) (14.01) (13.96) (6.84) (6.82) (6.85) (6.83) 
Unemployed 0.196* 0.196* 0.169 0.170 -0.405*** -0.382*** -0.422*** -0.400*** 
 (1.88) (1.88) (1.59) (1.61) (3.55) (3.36) (3.71) (3.54) 
Dummy informal worker -0.016 -0.023 -0.009 -0.013 -0.171*** -0.154*** -0.168*** -0.150*** 
 (0.40) (0.57) (0.22) (0.33) (5.61) (5.04) (5.50) (4.87) 
Dummy businessman 0.065 0.066 0.075 0.077 -0.100 -0.079 -0.096 -0.073 
 (0.99) (1.01) (1.15) (1.19) (1.55) (1.22) (1.50) (1.13) 
Dummy official 0.031 0.036 0.048 0.051 0.169 0.159 0.175 0.164 
 (0.22) (0.25) (0.34) (0.35) (0.87) (0.81) (0.92) (0.86) 
Dummy NGO 0.189 0.184 0.199 0.196 -0.229* -0.179 -0.221* -0.166 
 (1.48) (1.45) (1.58) (1.55) (1.95) (1.52) (1.89) (1.41) 
Dummy peasant 0.264* 0.265* 0.327** 0.331** -0.139 -0.152 -0.111 -0.121 
 (1.90) (1.91) (2.36) (2.39) (0.93) (1.02) (0.75) (0.82) 
Dummy politician 0.371 0.354 0.380* 0.365* -0.536** -0.536** -0.533** -0.533** 
 (1.57) (1.51) (1.70) (1.65) (2.16) (2.17) (2.16) (2.17) 
Country dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of observations 6312 6312 6312 6312 12175 12175 12175 12175 
 List of countries : Mali. Tanzania. omitted country : 
South Africa 
List of countries : Lesotho. Malawi. Mali. Namibia. 
South Africa. Tanzania. Zambia. Zimbabwe. 
Excluded country : Botswana. 
z statistics in parentheses ; *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
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 3.2 Social and political factors 
 The level of general trust in the society is an important determinant of the perception of 
corruption. Thus, those who have great confidence in the court of appeal are highly likely to 
perceive low levels of corruption. However, neither democracy nor participation in 
demonstrations seem to affect the attitude of individuals towards corruption. This latter result is 
line with the macroeconomic empirics of corruption. Indeed several studies found no significant 
effect of democracy on corruption (Paldam, 2002; Treisman, 2000; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Serra, 
2006; Brunetti and Weder, 2003). Surprising though this result may be, other components of 
democracy such as community life (community meetings, religious associations, development) 
have a high significance on perception of corruption.  
 The access to information through the press or listening to radio significantly affects the 
perception of corruption. This result is consistent with the study of Reineikka and Svensson 
(2003, 2005), and that of Brunetti and Weder (2002), who, using a cross-country macro-data 
showed that a free press may have a powerful controlling influence on corruption.  
 This study confirms that the media are a factor in the fight against corruption. However, 
some crucial issues should be highlighted in the context of developing countries. First, access to 
information through the media is limited due to the low level of development of infrastructures 
and the precarious financial situation of populations. This interaction between poverty and access 
to information appears in our regressions, where the introduction of the variable of poverty tends 
to lower the ratio of variable access to information. The same result applies for the low level of 
literacy. Individuals can certainly share information among themselves, with parents or friends, 
but access to information remains nonetheless a real challenge. Another problem concerns the 
controversy of the freedom of expression in the media. The media may be sanctioned and 
censored at any time. Access to information is therefore a valuable opportunity in the fight 
against corruption; and it is hoped that over time, institutional and economic maturity can 
produce positive results. 
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 Concluding remarks 
 
 This paper examines the phenomenon of corruption in the African context: corruption as 
defined in the literature seems to be an imported concept. It is therefore necessary to adapt it to 
the institutional context, taking into account the opinions of local populations.  
It attempts to identify microeconomic determinants of the perception of corruption. 
Econometric investigations indicate that individual characteristics such as age and sex affect 
significantly the perception people have of corruption as do social and political factors. More 
specifically, access to information appears to be a valuable tool in combating corruption. The 
microeconomic determinants that affect the perception of corruption are somewhat different from 
those found elsewhere, in Latin America (Mocan, 2004) or Eastern Europe (Čábelková, 2001). 
 
 A number of factors emerging from this first analysis warrant further investigation. In this 
paper, we focused only on the perception of corruption. Whether the individuals interviewed 
tolerate it or are victims of it has not been addressed. Thus, this article may be extended by 
considering corruption in terms of its acceptability or its effects on individuals (being a victim) in 
one country.  
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Appendices 
 
Table A1: Number of African countries in the ten most corrupt countries in the world 
 
1996 1998 2000 2002 
6 
Democratic R. Congo 
Somalia  
Liberia 
Sierra Leone 
Gabon 
Nigeria  
5 
Democratic R. Congo 
Somalia  
Liberia 
Cameroon  
Angola 
6 
Equatorial Guinea  
Somalia  
Democratic R. Congo 
Angola 
Burundi 
Liberia  
4 
Equatorial  Guinea  
Democratic R. Congo 
Nigeria 
Somalia 
Source: based on KKM (2003) data 
 
 
Tableau A2- : Definition of the variables of corruption in the Afrobarometer data 
 
Handling corruption 
How well would you say the government is handling the 
following matters? 
1=Very badly/Not al all well. 2=Quite badly/Not very 
well. 3=Fairly well. 4=Very well 
 
Extent of corruption/ Bribery 
What about corruption? How many officials in the government 
do you think are involved in corruption?  
1=Almost all; 2=Most; 3=Some; 4=Almost none  
Corruption among elected leaders 
What about corruption? How many people in the parliament do 
you think are involved in corruption?  
1=Almost all; 2=Most; 3=Some; 4=Almost none  
Corruption among civil servants 
How many civil servants. or those who work in government 
offices and ministries do you think are involved in corruption?  
1=Almost all; 2=Most; 3=Some; 4=Almost none  
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Appendix A3-Definitions of the other variables  
Age  Age of the individual (continue)  
Sex  Female = 1; Male = 0 
Rural  = 1 if the individual lives in rural areas and 0 in the 
city  
Education  Level of education 0 = no formal education 1 = 
Primary 2 = Secondary 3 = Post-secondary (treated as 
a continuous variable)  
Indicator of poverty  = (povfoo + povhth + povinc + povwat + pfeerd + 
pfenow) / 6  
(simple average of indicators of access to food. health 
care. drinking water. with no income. living 
conditions. economic situation in the country)  
0 = never 1 = rarely 2 = 3 = often forever 
Level of general trust 1 = You can have confidence in most people. 2 = You 
should be careful  
Member of an association  = 1 if the respondent is a member of a local 
development association. religion or a business 
association  
Take part in a demonstration  if the respondent has participated in a demonstration 
(community meetings. political demonstrations)  
0 = never 1 = once or twice 2 = only a few times 3 = 
often  
Write to the press  Write to the press: 0 = never 1 = once or twice 2 = 
only a few times 3 = often 
Listen to the radio  (medrad) 0 = never 1 = less than once per month 2 = 
roughly once a month 3 = roughly once a week 4 = 
Several times a week 5 = Every day  
Watching TV  (medtv) 0 = never 1 = less than once a month 2 = 
roughly once a month 3 = roughly once a week 4 = 
Several times a week 5 = Every day  
Read newspapers  (mednew) 0 = never 1 = less than once a month 2 = 
roughly once a month 3 = roughly once a week 4 = 
Several times a week 5 = Every day  
Access to information  1 if (medrad> = 3 | medtv> = 1 | mednew> = 1)  
Democracy  Meaning of democracy 1 = civil liberties and 
individual 2 = vote / electoral choice / competition 
multiparty  
Confidence in the Court of Appeal  1 = not at all 2 = a few times 3 = most of the time   
4=always  
Unemployed  1 = if the interviewee says that he is unemployed 0 
otherwise 
informal worker  = 1 if the individual works in the informal sector; 0 
otherwise  
Businessman  1 = if the interviewee is a businessman  0 otherwise  
Officer  1 = if the respondent is an official 0 otherwise  
NGOs  = 1 if the respondent works in an NGO 0 otherwise 
Farmer  = 1 if the respondent is a farmer 0 otherwise 
Politician  1 = if the interviewee is a politician 0 otherwise 
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Tableau A4- : Predicted probabilities for modalities of corruption  
 
 
Modalities Handling 
corruption 
Extent of corruption 
(bribery) (pfpcr2) 
Corruption among 
elected leaders 
Corruption among 
civil servants 
Almost all (=1) 0.31 0.20 0.16 0.19 
Most (=2) 0.23 0.28 0.24 0.31 
Some (=3) 0.27 0.30 0.30 0.28 
Almost none (=4) 0.13 0.09 0.11 0.08 
 
 
 
Appendix A5- : Predicted probabilities according to corruption modalities in African countries  
 
0
0,05
0,1
0,15
0,2
0,25
0,3
0,35
1 2 3 4
Corruption among elected leaders
0
0,05
0,1
0,15
0,2
0,25
0,3
0,35
1 2 3 4
Extent of corruption 
 
 
0
0,05
0,1
0,15
0,2
0,25
0,3
0,35
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Corruption among civil servants
 
